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Dominic L. Harkness
The free energy principle is based on Bayesian theory and generally makes use
of functional concepts. However, functional concepts explain phenomena in terms
of how they should work, not how they in fact do work. As a result one may ask
whether the free energy principle, taken as such, can provide genuine explana-
tions of cognitive phenomena. This commentary will argue that (i) the free energy
principle offers a stronger unification than Bayesian theory alone (strong unifica-
tion thesis) and that (ii) the free energy principle can act as a heuristic guide to
finding multilevel mechanistic explanations. 
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The free energy principle has far-reaching im-
plications for cognitive science. In fact, the free
energy principle seeks to explain everything re-
lated to the mind. Due to this explanatory am-
bition, it has been deemed preposterous by re-
searchers. Jakob Hohwy challenges the oppon-
ents of the free energy principle and its applica-
tions by demonstrating that this framework is
everything  but  preposterous.  Rather,  he  com-
pares the free energy principle with the theory
of evolution in biology. The theory of evolution
is not discarded due to its unifying power; and
the free energy principle shouldn’t be either. In
this paper I will present a negative as well as
two positive theses: first, the free energy prin-
ciple will be contrasted to Bayesian theory with
regard to the degree of unification they offer. I
will  argue  that  the  unification  resulting  from
the  free  energy  principle  can  be  regarded  as
stronger since it attempts to empirically ground
its conclusions in the brain via neuroscience and
psychology. The negative thesis consists in the
suggestion that one major flaw of the free en-
ergy principle, taken as such, lies within its ex-
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planatory  power.  As a result of being a func-
tional theory, the concepts it employs are also
functional.  Yet  functional  concepts,  at  least
when it comes to explaining the brain and cog-
nitive phenomena, do not explain how a certain
phenomenon actually works, but rather how it
should  work.  To  improve  this  situation,  the
second positive thesis of this paper makes use of
a  suggestion  by  Piccinini &  Craver (2011),
namely that functional analyses are mechanism
sketches, i.e., incomplete descriptions of mech-
anisms.  In  other  words,  functional  concepts
(such as precision) must be enriched with mech-
anistic concepts that include known structural
properties  (such  as  “dopamine”)  in  order  to
count  as  a  full  explanation  of  a  given  phe-
nomenon.  The  upshot  of  this  criticism  lies
within the free  energy principle’s  potential  to
act  as  a  heuristic  guide for  finding  multilevel
mechanistic explanations. Furthermore, this pa-
per will not advocate that functional concepts
should be fully replaced or eliminated, but that
functional and mechanistic descriptions comple-
ment each other. 
2 The free energy principle
In his article “The Neural Organ Explains the
Mind”,  Jakob Hohwy (this collection) proposes
that the brain, as every other organ in the hu-
man body,  serves  one  basic  function.  Just  as
one  might  say that  the  basic  function  of  the
heart  is  to  pump blood through the  body or
that of the lungs is to provide oxygen, the basic
function of the brain is to minimise free energy
(Friston 2010). However, this is a very general
claim that does not yet establish how the min-
imisation of free energy is realised in humans.
How is this done?
Very generally, the brain stores statistical
regularities from the outer  environment or,  in
other words, it forms an internal model about
the causal structure of the world. This model is
then  used  to  predict  the  next  sensory  input.
Consequently, we have two values that can be
compared with each other: the predicted sens-
ory feedback and the actual sensory feedback.
When  perceiving,  the  brain  predicts  what  its
own next state will be. Depending on the accur-
acy  of  the  prediction,  a  divergence  will  be
present  between the  predicted and the actual
sensory feedback. This divergence is  measured
in  terms  of  prediction  errors.  The  larger  the
amount of prediction error, the less accurately
the model fits the actual sensory feedback and
thus  the  causal  structure  of  the  world.  Cru-
cially, the model that fits best, i.e., that which
brings forth the smallest amount of prediction
error,  also  determines  consciousness.  In  this
framework, free energy amounts to the sum of
prediction  errors.  Thus,  minimizing  prediction
errors  always  entails  the  minimisation  of  free
energy. 
The minimization of prediction error can
generally be achieved in  two ways:  either  the
brain can change its  models  according to the
sensory input or, vice versa, it can change the
sensory input according to its models.  In this
scheme  the  former  mode  can  be  seen  as
veridical perception, whereas the latter can be
seen as action, or more formally active inference
—the fulfillment of predictions via classic reflex
arcs (Friston et al. 2009;  Friston et al. 2011).
Furthermore, two other factors play a large role
in  the  minimization  of  prediction  error:  first,
the precision, or “second-order statistics” (Hes-
selmann et al. 2012), which ultimately encodes
how “trustworthy” the actual sensory input is.
Precision is realised by synaptic gain, and it has
been established that the modulation of preci-
sion  corresponds  to  attention  (Hohwy 2012).
Second, model optimization ensures that models
are reduced in complexity in order to account
for the largest number of possible states in the
long run, i.e., under expected levels of fluctuat-
ing noise. For example, sleep has been associ-
ated with this type of model optimization (Hob-
son & Friston 2012). More detailed descriptions
of these four factors, i.e., perception, active in-
ference, precision, and model optimization can
be found in Hohwy’s article.
Additionally, models are arranged in a cor-
tical hierarchy (Mumford 1992). This hierarchy
is characterised, as Hohwy points out (this col-
lection, p. 7), by time and space: models higher
up in the hierarchy have a larger temporal scale
and involve larger receptive fields than models
lower down in the hierarchy, which concern pre-
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dictions at fast time scales and involve small re-
ceptive  fields  (p.  7).  This  hierarchy implies  a
constant  message-passing  amongst  different
levels. Once a sensory signal arrives at the low-
est level it is compared to the predictions com-
ing from the next higher level (in this case level
two).1 If prediction errors ensue they are sent to
the higher level (still level two). Here they are
predicted  by the  next  higher  level  (now level
three). This process goes on until prediction er-
rors are minimised to expected levels of noise.
Now the general scheme of prediction er-
ror minimization can be presented: the brain
builds models that represent the causal struc-
ture of the world. These models are, in turn,
used to generate predictions about what the
next sensory input might be. The two result-
ing values,  i.e.,  the predicted and the actual
sensory feedback, are continuously compared.
The  divergence  between  these  two  values  is
the prediction error, or free energy. Since it is
the  brain’s  main  function  to  minimise  the
amount of free energy and therefore prediction
error,  it  will  either change its models or en-
gage  in  active  inference.  Decisions  about
which path will be taken depend on the preci-
sion of the incoming sensory signal (or predic-
tion  error).  Signals  with  high  precision  are
taken  to  be  “trustworthy”,  and  therefore
model changes can follow. Low precision sig-
nals,  however,  require  further  investigation
since noise could be the principal factor in an
ambiguous input.  In addition,  models  during
wakefulness  are  changed  “on-the-fly”,  thus
leading  to  highly  idiosyncratic  and  complex
models.  This  complexity  is  reduced,  for  ex-
ample during sleep (Hobson &  Friston 2012),
to  increase  the  generalizability  of  models,
since noise is always present. 
3 Bayesian theory and unification
As mentioned above,  all  this  serves the  basic
function of the brain: the minimization of free
energy. This strategy is employed in every as-
pect of cognition; thus the free energy principle
(Friston 2010) is a grand unifying theory. But
1 The numerical values for the levels have no scientific relevance. They
are used only for illustrative purposes. 
from where does the free energy principle derive
its unifying power?2
The  free  energy  principle  makes  use  of
Bayesian theory, which can be regarded as its
foundation. For some years now, Bayesian the-
ory  has  been  applied  to  many cognitive  phe-
nomena, since it may “offer a new interpreta-
tion of the goals of cognitive systems, in terms
of  inductive  probabilistic  inference  […][,]  can
make the assumptions of Bayesian models more
transparent  than  in  mechanistically  oriented
models […][and] may have the potential to ex-
plain some of the most complex aspects of hu-
man cognition […]” (Jones & Love 2011, p. 170).
Yet  Jones &  Love (2011) also address the fact
that Bayesian theories, although aiming at re-
searching  and  investigating  the  human  brain
and its workings, remain unconstrained by psy-
chology and neuroscience “and are generally not
grounded in empirical measurement” (ibid.,  p.
169). They term this approach “Bayesian Fun-
damentalism”,  since it  entails  that  all  that  is
necessary  to  explain  human  behaviour  is  ra-
tional analysis. Supporters of this position rely
on  the  mathematical  framework  of  Bayesian
theory as  the origin  of  its  explanatory power
and unification. The positive thesis of  Jones &
Love (2011)  consists  in  arguing for  “Bayesian
Enlightenment”  that  tries  to  include  mechan-
istic  explanation  in  Bayesian  theory.  To  give
more detail, they propose that, rather than fol-
lowing Bayesian Fundamentalism and thus be-
ing “logically unable to account for mechanistic
constraints on behavior […] one could treat vari-
ous elements of  Bayesian models  as  psycholo-
gical  assumptions  subject  to  empirical  test”
(Jones & Love 2011, p. 184). Similarly, Colombo
&  Hartmann (2014) argue that although “the
Bayesian framework […] does not necessarily re-
veal aspects of a mechanism[,] Bayesian unifica-
tion […] can place fruitful constraints on causal-
mechanical explanation” (Colombo & Hartmann
2014, p. 1). 
According  to  Colombo &  Hartmann
(2014), many Bayesian theorists falsely equate
unification  with  explanatory  power.  But
Bayesian theories derive their unificatory power
2 At this point I would like to thank one of the reviewers for her or his
substantial advice and constructive comments.
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from their  mathematical  framework.  However,
just because different cognitive phenomena can
be  mathematically  unified  does  not  entail  a
causal relationship between them, and nor does
the  mathematical  unification  tell  us  anything
about the causal  history of  these phenomena.
However, as will be presented in the next sec-
tion, explanatory power, at least from a mech-
anistic point of view, results from investigating
structural components and their causal interac-
tions that  give rise  to  a certain phenomenon.
For example Kaplan & Craver (2011) write that
“[…] the line that demarcates explanations from
merely  empirically  adequate  models  seems  to
correspond to whether the model describes the
relevant causal structures that produce, under-
lie, or maintain the explanandum phenomenon”
(p. 602). Yet in the case of Bayesian theory—
and Bayesian Fundamentalism in particular—,
this cannot be achieved, since they “say nothing
about the spatio-temporally organized compon-
ents and causal activities that may produce par-
ticular  cognitive phenomena […]”  (Colombo &
Hartmann 2014,  p.  5).  But  not  everything  is
lost concerning the explanatory role of Bayesian
theories.  Even  if  Bayesian  theory  cannot
provide mechanistic  explanations,  it  may non-
etheless be beneficial to cognitive science by of-
fering constraints on causal-mechanical explana-
tion (Colombo & Hartmann 2014). 
This brings us to the free energy principle.
As  noted,  the  free  energy  principle  is,  at  its
core, a theory that makes use of Bayesian the-
ory; consequently it inherits all of Bayesian the-
ory’s pros and cons. Thus, since unification in
the free energy principle is also grounded in its
mathematical  foundations  “[…]  the  real  chal-
lenge  is  to  understand  how  [the  free  energy
principle] manifests in the brain” (Friston 2010,
p. 10). With regard to  Jones &  Love’s (2011)
distinction, the free energy principle can be con-
sidered  to  belong  to  Bayesian  Enlightenment,
since  it  attempts  to  ground  its  findings  in
neurobiology  and  psychology  rather  than  re-
maining unconstrained by these  sciences.  Fur-
thermore, due to the fact that the free energy
principle integrates neuroscientific findings into
its  conclusions,  it  can offer  more precise  con-
straints on causal-mechanical explanations than
Bayesian theory alone. For example, the free en-
ergy  principle  tries  to  incorporate  neuros-
cientific facts about brain structure and its hier-
archical organization, or tries to link concepts
such as  “precision” to neurophysiological  phe-
nomena such as “dopaminergic gating” (Friston
et al. 2012).3 The latter example will be presen-
ted in greater detail in section 5. 
In sum, the free energy principle offers a
form  of  unification  that  exceeds  that
offered by Bayesian theory alone. It makes
statements  about  how  the  free  energy
principle could be realised in the brain and
does  not  solely  rely  on its  mathematical
framework.  Thus,  one  could  term  the
former a “strong unification thesis” (SUT)
and the latter a “weak unification thesis”
(WUT).
If the free energy principle is true it creates
a backdrop against which other theories must be
evaluated. This also implies a kind of explanatory
monopolization, since “the free energy principle is
not a theory that lends itself particularly well to
piecemeal” (Hohwy this collection, p. 9). In other
words, as Hohwy highlights on many occasions,
the free energy principle is an all-or-nothing the-
ory. He compares it to the theory of evolution in
biology and states that, just like the free energy
principle,  “evolution  posits  such  a  fundamental
mechanism that anything short of universal quan-
tification would invalidate it” (p. 10). Due to this
large explanatory ambition, some researchers have
described the free energy principle as preposter-
ous. Yet “the issue whether the free energy prin-
ciple is preposterous cannot be decided just by
pointing to its explanatory ambition […] [but] by
considering the evidence in favour of the free en-
ergy principle” (p. 11). This is a very important
transition, i.e., the switch from explanatory ambi-
tion to explanatory power, since, from a mechan-
istic  viewpoint,  the  former  gives  no  statement
about the veridicality of its assumptions, whereas
the latter does. 
3 However, I’d like to point out that the free energy principle does
not make any commitments to one single neuroscientific theory.
Rather, it tries to find entities that may realize the free energy
principle in the brain; what these entities are remains to be in -
quired.
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In the remainder of this paper, I will argue
that one major shortcoming of  the free energy
principle lies in its explanatory power. The main
issue  to  be  discussed  consists  in  the  fact  that
most concepts employed in the free energy prin-
ciple, or in its applications such as predictive cod-
ing (Friston 2005;  Rao &  Ballard 1999) or pre-
dictive processing (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013), are
principally functional  concepts.  Yet,  at  least in
the case of the free energy principle, functional
concepts do not hold much explanatory power,
since they “describe how things ought to work
rather than how they in fact work” (Craver 2013,
p. 18). For example, the concept of “precision”
represents the amount of uncertainty in the in-
coming sensory signal that may arise due to noise.
Thus the precision of the incoming sensory inputs
determines how an agent interacts with its envir-
onment next: it can either change its models or
its sensory input. Yet, this description holds no
commitments as to how precision is realised in
the brain; it only describes what effect precision
should have on a given cognitive system. There-
fore the free energy principle seems to be of a
normative,  rather  than descriptive,  nature.4 On
the other hand, there are mechanistic explana-
tions that, according to  Craver (2007), can also
count  as  such,  since  they  don’t  describe  how
things should work but how they in fact do work. 
Yet these two types of epistemic strategies
don’t necessarily exclude each other. Here I want
to introduce  Piccinini &  Craver’s  (2011) claim
that functional analyses can serve as “mechanism
sketches”. The upshot lies within the free energy-
principle’s unifying power: it can act as a kind of
conceptual guide for revealing mechanistic explan-
ations. Once physiological concepts are mapped
onto the functional concepts derived from the free
energy-principle,  multilevel mechanistic explana-
tions  follow.  But  before  this  is  elaborated  the
next  section  will  give  a  short  introduction  to
mechanistic explanation (Craver 2007).
4 Mechanistic explanation
Mechanistic  explanation  claims  that  in  order
“[t]o  explain  a  phenomenon,  […]  one  has  to
4 This does not mean that the free energy principle is false. On the contrary,
this paper will present an attempt to increase its explanatory potential.
know what its components are,  what they do
and how they are organized […]” (Craver & Ka-
plan 2011, p. 269). It does not suffice to merely
be  able,  e.g.  to  accurately  predict  a  phe-
nomenon. Craver & Kaplan (2011, p. 271) show
this by referring to the example of a heat gauge
on a car. Despite the fact that the gauge repres-
ents engine heat and that one can also predict
when the engine will overheat by looking at the
gauge, it doesn’t explain why the engine is over-
heating.  It  only  states  that  it  is—not  how it
came about.  Thus,  mechanists  introduced the
“model-to-mechanism-mapping”  (3M)  require-
ment for explanatory models:
(3M) A model of a target phenomenon ex-
plains that phenomenon when (a) the vari-
ables in the model correspond to identifi-
able  components  and  organizational  fea-
tures  of  the  target  mechanism that  pro-
duces,  maintains,  or  underlies  the  phe-
nomenon, and (b) the causal relations pos-
ited among these variables  in  the model
correspond to the activities or operations
among the components of the target mech-
anism. (Kaplan 2011, p. 272)
This requirement can serve as a demarcation cri-
terion as to when a model can actually be seen as
explanatory. But how does mechanistic explana-
tion progress? Two principal approaches are de-
scribed by Craver & Kaplan (2011): reductionism
and integrationism.  The former  tries  to  reduce
mental phenomena into ever-smaller entities. Its
most radical form, “ruthless reductionism”, is ad-
vocated by  John Bickle (2003), who states that
neuroscience should reduce “[…] psychological con-
cepts and kinds to molecular-biological mechan-
isms  and  pathways”  (Bickle 2006,  p.  412).  In
other  words,  mental  phenomena  should  be  ex-
plained with low-level concepts. The integrationist
approach, on the other hand, claims that explana-
tions can be found across a hierarchy of mechan-
isms (Craver 2007), since every mechanism is it-
self  embedded  into  a  higher-level  mechanism.
Consequently, reductionism isn’t the only option,
since “[…] mechanistic explanation requires con-
sideration not just of the parts and operations in
the  mechanism  but  also  of  the  organization
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within  the  mechanism and the  environment  in
which the mechanism is situated” (Bechtel 2009,
p. 544). In particular, multilevel mechanistic ex-
planations consider three viewpoints on any given
mechanism: the etiological, constitutive, and con-
textual aspects (Craver 2013). At the etiological
level, the causal history of a given mechanism is
investigated at the same level of the hierarchy.
Yet mechanisms can also be broken down into
smaller, more specialised mechanisms. When in-
vestigating the internal mechanisms that give rise
to a mechanism at a higher level, one can speak
of the constitutive aspect of mechanistic explana-
tion. This strategy resembles reductionism most.
But,  as  mentioned  before,  every  mechanism is
also embedded in a higher-level mechanism. Thus,
one must also investigate how a given mechanism
contributes to the next higher-level mechanism.
This has been termed the contextual aspect, be-
cause it situates a mechanism into a higher-order
context. After this short introduction into mech-
anistic  explanation,  the  next  section  will  show
how this relates to the problem above, i.e., that
applications of the free energy principle operate
with functional concepts and thus can’t serve as
full explanations.
5 The free energy principle as heuristic 
guide
Here I will  follow  Piccinini &  Craver’s (2011)
proposal that functional descriptions are noth-
ing other than mechanism sketches that derive
their “[…] explanatory legitimacy from the idea
that [they][…] capture something of the causal
structure  of  the  system”  (Piccinini &  Craver
2011,  p. 306).  Mechanism sketches are simply
outlines of mechanisms that haven’t been fully
investigated  with  regard  to  their  structural
properties.  Thus,  functional  descriptions  serve
as placeholders until a mechanistic explanation
can fully account for a given phenomenon by
enriching functional concepts with concepts re-
lated to its structural properties.5 The explanat-
ory gaps6 resulting from the functional nature of
5 However, as a preliminary note, both functional and structural prop-
erties are needed for a full mechanistic explanation (cf.  Piccinini &
Craver 2011, p. 290).
6 In this paper, the term “explanatory gap” is not used in the sense of
“an  explanatory  gap […]  between  the  functions  and  experience”
the free energy principle could then be closed,
leading to a shift from explanatory ambition to
explanatory power. This also directly relates to
the alleged preposterousness of the free energy
principle, since the process of “filling-in” will di-
minish any residual doubts about the theory’s
truthfulness. This can be applied to the free en-
ergy principle, which works with functional con-
cepts  such  as  “precision”,  “prediction  error”,
“model optimization” or “attention”: “[o]nce the
missing aspects are filled in, a functional ana-
lysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explan-
ation” (Piccinini &  Craver 2011, p. 284). Take
the concept of precision in the free energy prin-
ciple as an example. As described above, preci-
sion gives an estimate concerning the “trustwor-
thiness” of a given sensory signal and its ensu-
ing prediction errors. Taken as such, precision is
clearly a functional concept since it is “[…] spe-
cified in  terms of  effects  on some medium or
component under certain conditions” (Piccinini
& Craver 2011, p. 291) without committing to
any structural entities that could realise these
functional  properties.  However,  according  to
Friston et al. (2012), “[…] dopaminergic gating
may represent a Bayes-optimal encoding of pre-
cision that enhances the processing of particular
sensory  representations  by  selectively  biasing
bottom-up sensory  information  (prediction  er-
rors)” (p. 2). In turn, “dopaminergic gating” in-
volves  the  neurotransmitter  dopamine,  a  mo-
lecule that can be structurally described. Cru-
cially, now that the functional concept of preci-
sion, derived from the free energy principle, has
been linked with dopaminergic gating, one can
make further inferences as to how this entity is
situated  in  a  multilevel  mechanism.  For  ex-
ample, the modulation of precision has been as-
sociated  with  attention  (Feldman &  Friston
2010; Hohwy 2012), and since precision is real-
ised via dopamine mediation, one can investig-
ate the effects of dopamine on attentional mech-
anisms.7 On the other hand, if empirical evid-
ence regarding precision or in particular predic-
tions of precisions (hyperpriors) find “[…] that
(Chalmers 1995, p. 205; see Levine 1983 for the classical reference),
as we see in the philosophy of mind. Rather, it describes the lack of
neurobiological details in functional concepts.
7 Of course, to do so one would also have to know all the components
involved in the mechanism responsible for attention.
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descending signals do not mediate expected pre-
cisions, this would falsify the free energy prin-
ciple” (p. 16). This further accentuates the need
for mechanistic explanations. 
As  a  more  elaborate  example,  the  phe-
nomenon of biased competition will shortly be
introduced. In biased competition, two stimuli
are presented at a topographically identical loc-
ation. However, only one of these stimuli is ac-
tually  perceived.  Thus  the  principal  question:
by  which  means  does  the  brain  “select”  any
given stimuli? In the free energy principle, the
most obvious answer would be the stimulus that
best minimises free energy or prediction error.
However, in these cases, the stimuli are equally
accurate,  i.e.,  they  both  represent  the  causal
structure of the world equally well.  As a con-
sequence, the stimuli will “[…] compete for the
responses of  cells  in  visual  cortex” (Desimone
1998,  p.  1245).  Crucially,  Desimone (1998)
brings up a preliminary study by Reynolds et
al. (1994) that states “[…] that attention serves
to modulate the suppressive interaction between
two or more stimuli  within the receptive field
[…]” (Desimone 1998, p. 1250). Thus, attention
could  be  the  determining  factor  as  to  which
stimulus is perceived at a given moment. From
the perspective of the free energy principle and
in accordance with these findings,  Feldman &
Friston (2010) propose that “[…] attention is the
process of optimizing synaptic gain to represent
the precision of sensory information (prediction
error)  during  hierarchical  inference”  (p.  2).
These two views agree, since synaptic gain also
entails a suppressive effect upon the other com-
peting stimuli. Also, as just mentioned, Friston
et al. (2012) identify precision weighting with
dopaminergic  gating,  i.e.,  they  argue  that
dopamine mediation realises the precision of in-
coming stimuli or prediction errors. 
Now  a  fuller  picture  can  be  presented.
This much more complete picture allows us to
see how the free energy principle or prediction
error minimization framework can prove to be
beneficial  with regard to mechanistic explana-
tion. The phenomenon to be explained is biased
competition.  The  mechanism  that  realises,  or
resolves,  biased competition, i.e.,  the competi-
tion between two identically accurate and topo-
graphically identical stimuli, is precision weight-
ing. This represents the etiological level of de-
scription since it describes how biased competi-
tion is  resolved at  a  level  of  description that
doesn’t refer to lower-level processes nor to how
they are embedded into a higher order mechan-
ism. It remains at the same level in the hier-
archy of mechanisms. At the constitutive level
we  have  the  fact  presented  by  Friston et  al.
(2012),  that  precision  weighting  is  neuro-
physiologically realised by dopaminergic gating.
This  constitutes precision weighting and is loc-
ated at a lower level. Last, precision weighting
is embedded into the higher-order mechanism of
attention.  Precision  weighting  contributes  to
this higher order mechanism, or, from the other
perspective,  attention  is  constituted  by  preci-
sion weighting.  This  represents  the contextual
description. 
The upshot is that, just as “[e]volutionary
thinking can be heuristically useful as a guide
to creative thinking about what an organism or
organ is  doing […]”  (Craver 2013,  p.  20),  the
free energy principle can be a useful guide in
finding multilevel mechanistic explanations con-
cerning how the mind works. Due to its unifying
power, the free energy principle offers a grand
framework that seeks to explain every aspect of
human cognition. Thus, filling increasingly more
mechanistic concepts into functional placehold-
ers will enable an understanding of the mind in
terms of  how it  does  work instead of  how it
ought to work. The explanatory worth of  the
free energy principle would then be preserved,
since “[i]f these heuristics contribute to reveal-
ing  some  relevant  aspects  of  the  mechanisms
that  produce  phenomena  of  interest,  then
Bayesian  unification  has  genuine  explanatory
traction” (Colombo & Hartmann 2014, p. 3). 
However, this should not be seen as an at-
tempt to eliminate functional concepts by redu-
cing them to mechanistic ones. Instead, as men-
tioned  above,  the  integrationist  account  em-
phasises  that  functional  and  mechanistic  con-
cepts are both necessary for mechanistic explan-
ations,  since  “structural  descriptions constrain
the  space  of  plausible  functional  descriptions,
and functional descriptions are elliptical mech-
anistic descriptions” (Piccinini &  Craver 2011,
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p.  307).  Furthermore,  once  every  functional
term has a mechanistic counterpart, the 3M re-
quirement posed by mechanists can be fulfilled
in the case of the free energy principle.
Last,  as  a  general  remark,  searching  for
structural  properties  seems  important  if  re-
searchers want to ground the free energy prin-
ciple  in  the human brain.  Functional  theories
are subject to multiple realizability. This means
that  not  only  humans  or  mammals  could  be
bound  to  the  free  energy  principle,  but  also
Martians  or  bacteria  or  anything  that  could
possess  the “hardware” to do so.  Hohwy sug-
gests that the free energy principle can be seen
as a biofunctionalist  theory (this collection p.
20). In principle this means that the free energy
principle  can  be  multiply  realised  as  long  as
that creature acts in such a way as to maintain
itself in a certain set of expected states. These
expected  states  then  determine  the  creature’s
phenotype. In seeking to explain human cogni-
tion,  functional  theories  have  to  be  enriched
with mechanistic concepts relating to structural
properties, since otherwise we could also be in-
vestigating Martians. 
6 Conclusion
The negative thesis of this paper states that the
free energy principle’s explanatory power, unlike
its unificatory power, can be regarded as weak,
since it does not fulfil the 3M requirement pos-
ited by mechanists. This follows from the fact
that  the  free  energy  principle  is  a  functional
theory, thus also employing functional concepts.
Yet  these  do  not  explain  how  a  given  phe-
nomenon  in  fact  does  work  but  only  how  it
should  work.  However,  Piccinini &  Craver
(2011)  propose  that  functional  analyses,  ulti-
mately,  are  nothing  else  but  mechanism
sketches,  i.e.,  incomplete  mechanistic  explana-
tions. 
In this paper I have tried to make a posit-
ive contribution to the discussion by arguing for
two claims: first, since the free energy principle
incorporates  empirical  results  from psychology
and neuroscience it provides a stronger case of
unification (SUT) than the unification provided
by Bayesian theory alone. By not solely relying
on its mathematical foundation, the free energy
principle can try to ground its findings empiric-
ally in the brain. As a result, both the free en-
ergy principle and theories from psychology and
neuroscience can constrain each other, thus be-
ing beneficiary to one another. Second, I argue
that the free energy principle can act as a guide
to finding multilevel  mechanistic  explanations.
By linking mechanistic concepts with functional
concepts from the free energy principle, the 3M
requirement posited by mechanists can be ful-
filled,  consequently  leading to  actual  explana-
tions. This relates to the accused preposterous-
ness of the free energy principle: with increasing
explanatory power it becomes more and more
difficult to deny that the free energy principle
itself is, in fact, true. 
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